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Chapter 7 High Reliability Organisations 
Making care safer through reliability and resilience 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of some of the key lessons from the theory of industrial 
High Reliability Organisations (HRO) that might be applied in healthcare in order to improve 
the safety of care delivered to patients.  HROs have been described as organisations that 
manage to have few or no significant accidents even though they operate complex 
technology in highly hazardous environments, such as aircraft carriers and nuclear power 
plants [1].   
 
Patient safety is an area of significant public concern.  In the UK, there has been much 
media coverage of the findings of the Public Inquiry into the failings at Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust.  The report suggests that between 2005 – 2009 as many as 1,200 
patients died needlessly as a result of inadequate and often appalling standards of care [2].  
Research undertaken in different countries and different health systems has provided ample 
evidence that patients around the world are suffering preventable adverse events [3-8].  
Adverse events cause unnecessary suffering, and they also have significant financial 
implications resulting from additional bed days and extended care requirements of patients, 
as well as from increased insurance and litigation costs [3, 9].   
 
In order to improve patient safety, and to reduce the number of adverse events, healthcare 
organisations have been encouraged to consider lessons about safety management 
practices in safety-critical industries [10, 11].  For example, commercial aviation is 
considered an ultra-safe industry, and there have been frequent attempts to transfer some of 
the tools, methods and approaches from this industry to healthcare.  Examples include the 
introduction of incident reporting systems [12] and the adoption of aviation-style checklists to 
manage safety-critical tasks, such as the WHO surgical safety checklist [13].  Learning from 
industry is a reasonable suggestion [14], but the successful transfer of lessons from industry 
to health care often proves to be challenging in practice [15, 16].  When transferring and 
applying lessons from industry to healthcare it is important to understand the underlying 
theory, the benefits and the limitations of tools and methods within their original industrial 
context [17].    
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the theory of HROs as developed in 
industrial contexts, and based on this, to identify some lessons that might be helpful in 
healthcare contexts to make the delivery of care both more reliable and safer.  The next 
section describes the key characteristics of industrial HROs.  The following three sections 
then discuss in turn lessons from the theory of HROs for enhancing the reliability of care, for 
making the delivery of care more resilient, and for organisational learning.  A summary of the 
key points concludes the chapter.         
 
Chapter Objectives 
• Provide an overview of the theory High Reliability Organisations 
• Introduce principles of risk analysis and risk control for enhancing reliability 
• Highlight the importance of performance variability for enhancing resilience   
• Discuss the role of organisational learning for sustaining progress with patient safety  
 
Theory of High Reliability Organisations 
The importance of studying what goes well 
Traditionally, organisations and systems aim to learn from what goes wrong [18], for 
example by analysing aviation accidents or by investigating the accidental release of toxic 
materials from chemical processing plants.  The aim of learning from such extraordinary 
catastrophes is to prevent similar events from recurring [19].  In the 1980s a group of 
researchers at the University of California, Berkeley suggested that novel insights into safety 
management and improved safety performance might be developed by studying 
organisations that had successfully avoided disaster despite operating with complex 
technology in hazardous situations.  The group studied in depth the safety management 
activities and safety behaviours of three types of organisations with an outstanding safety 
record – the US air traffic control system, a company operating a nuclear power plant and an 
electricity distribution system, and the US Navy’s operation of aircraft carriers [20-22].  The 
basic premise of the resulting theory of HROs is that there are processes, systems and 
behaviours that can be put in place that enable organisations operating complex technology 
in hazardous conditions to prevent and recover from errors in order to maintain an 
exceptional safety record over long periods of time.  In order to understand what these 
processes, systems and behaviours are, and how they can be sustained in practice, it is 
necessary to study not only how organisations fail, but also how they succeed to avert 
disaster on a daily basis, i.e. to study their ordinary, everyday performance [23, 24].     
 
A model of HROs – mindful organising 
The original empirical research did not set out explicitly to study HROs.  This term was 
coined during the research, and there have been numerous definitions of what an HRO 
might look like.  This has not been without controversy, and it has been suggested that it is 
actually not possible to identify objectively whether an organisation is, or is not, an HRO [25, 
26].  Based on the HRO research, Carl Weick and colleagues developed a model of what 
they then referred to as “mindful organisation” [27].  This model describes a number of 
characteristics and behaviours that organisations should aspire to in order to manage safety.  
The model can be thought of as an ideal rather than as something concrete against which 
organisations can be measured [25].  The five organisational characteristics and behaviours 
are [27]: (1) preoccupation with failures, (2) reluctance to simplify, (3) sensitivity to 
operations, (4) commitment to resilience, and (5) deference to expertise.  These are 
discussed in turn below, and then put into a healthcare context in the subsequent sections.   
 
Preoccupation with failure 
A good past safety track record might lead to complacency, the diversion of resources for 
reasons of efficiency, and a reluctance to report and to acknowledge evidence that might call 
the good performance into question.  HROs are preoccupied with failure because they seek 
out evidence of even small errors, and they treat these as potential precursors to larger 
failures and disaster.  They encourage active reporting and speaking up by front line staff, 
and they ensure that as an organisation they have the capacity to listen and to act on such 
concerns.  Often, these errors and early warning signs are, in fact, innocent and without 
further consequence, but staff are congratulated for reporting these rather than reprimanded 
for wasting time or causing unnecessary problems.     
 
Reluctance to simplify 
In order to manage an organisation in a complex environment one has to simplify and get on 
with things.  However, simplification means discarding some information as noise in favour 
of other more salient aspects, and this bears the risk of discarding the wrong information.  
HROs breed a reluctance to simplify explanations by fostering a culture of diverse viewpoints 
and of constructive criticism.  They avoid simplistic interpretations of failures such as 
labelling them human errors.  HROs invest in diversity, and they create an infrastructure that 
provides resource to investigate and pursue potential problems proactively and more widely.       
 
Sensitivity to operations 
HROs are sensitive to operations by being attentive to the experience of front line staff.  
They recognise that in their complex operating environment, front line staff have to adapt to 
the situations on the ground.  Managers in HROs encourage staff to report their concerns 
and to speak up about any errors, safety problems or other potential sources of failure.  
HROs recognise that a culture of fear might disable the necessary flow of information, and 
prevent the organisation from functioning and adapting effectively.  
 
Commitment to resilience 
HROs are not error free, but they are able to deal with errors and contain their 
consequences before they can lead to actual failures.  This is achieved through a 
commitment to resilience, which, in practice, requires investment in systems, processes, and 
people to provide redundancy and overlap in order to recover from errors.  Critical 
infrastructure might be duplicated, alternative ways of achieving goals are planned and 
designed, and staff are trained to deal with failures and to improvise novel ways of working 
and workarounds to existing problems.   
 
Deference to expertise 
In time-critical situations, decisions are delegated to the people with the greatest level of 
relevant expertise, rather than to the member of staff with the highest level of formal 
authority.  This enables HROs to act quickly in changing and challenging environments.  
HROs also cultivate a culture of listening to expertise, for example in situations that are not 
time-critical, but where technical experts might raise concerns.  In these situations, staff can 
abort missions or escalate their concerns irrespective of their ranking in the organisational 
hierarchy.   
  
Steps towards becoming an HRO   
The model of mindful organising presented above sets out an ideal set of characteristics and 
behaviours to which organisations can aspire.  It is unlikely, or even unrealistic, that an 
organisation can simply adopt these principles from one moment to another across all of its 
operations in a uniform manner.  The more likely scenario is that organisations will have to 
go through a journey towards becoming an HRO, and this journey might be faster in some 
areas, and slower and more cumbersome in other areas of an organisation [28].  Certain 
aspects might be more developed in one area, while other aspects are better implemented 
elsewhere.   
 
The model of mindful organising is closely linked to issues of reliability and managing known 
risks on the one hand, and to resilience and adaptive capacity to deal with changes and 
surprises on the other hand.  These two abilities – to control known risks and to adapt to 
changes – are underpinned by a third ability, which is the ability to continuously learn and 
evolve as an organisation.   
 
Enhancing Reliability – Risk Analysis and Risk Control 
The need for reliable care processes 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that care processes are generally not delivered 
reliably.  In the area of medicines management and prescribing, studies have suggested that 
prescribing errors occur in 1.5-9.2% of hospital medication orders [29].  This wide range of 
figures is due to differences in settings, definitions and data collection methods.  A median 
error rate of 7% was reported in an international systematic review of prescribing errors in 
hand-written medication orders for hospital inpatients [30].  A major study in the US found 
that patients received scientifically recommended care in only 55% of the cases [31].  
However there were significant differences depending on the condition considered.  For 
example, patients received 78.7% of recommended care for senile cataract where as only as 
little as 10.5% for alcohol dependence.  This evidence suggests that there is large variation 
in the reliability of different care processes, and that, overall, care process have a significant 
failure rate that can be improved upon.      
 
Identifying and controlling risks 
In order to improve the reliability of processes organisations usually attempt to exert greater 
managerial control over how care is delivered [28].  This can often be in the form of 
simplification and standardisation of processes, for example through the use of process 
mapping [32], Lean methodologies [33, 34], and the introduction of care bundles [35].   
 
Another frequently recommended approach is the use of a method called Failure Mode & 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) [36].  FMEA is a proactive, inductive, bottom-up approach for 
analysing processes in order to identify and to evaluate the main vulnerabilities and the 
potential for failures.  Like process mapping, FMEA is carried out in a multi-disciplinary group 
setting in order to ensure that different perspectives are considered.  FMEA often starts with 
a process map, and then asks a number of questions for each step in the process: (1) How 
could this process step fail? (2) What are potential causes for the failure? (3) What might be 
the consequences of the failure? (4) How likely is such a scenario? A risk priority number is 
then assigned to each failure based on the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of the 
consequences.  In this way, the failures can be prioritised in terms of the risk they pose.   
 
FMEA is a useful tool in order to understand key vulnerabilities of care processes, so that 
these can be addressed and controlled before small errors aggregate and cause larger 
failures or adverse events and patient harm.  FMEA has been used in a number of different 
care settings including intravenous drug infusion [37], blood transfusion [38] and emergency 
care handover [39].  However, there has also been criticism of the approach in healthcare, 
suggesting that it was time consuming [40], demonstrated low reliability when used by 
different teams [41], and that the focus on single errors might not be adequate to capture the 
complexity of real failure scenarios in healthcare [42].  It is worth bearing these criticisms in 
mind, but arguably the benefit of adopting an approach such as FMEA comes from the 
proactive discussion around potential failure opportunities within a multi-disciplinary team in 
a systematic and structured fashion.  Investing in such activities is a prerequisite for 
enhancing the reliability of care processes to higher levels, and it is a key component of 
mindful organising.      
 
Enhancing Resilience – Performance Variability  
Reliability and safety 
Improving the reliability of care processes by exerting greater managerial control over 
processes and behaviours is a useful start.  However, in order to achieve higher levels of 
safety, and to aspire to the performance of ultra-safe industries such as commercial aviation, 
this is not enough.  Reliability is not the same as safety, and being more reliable does not 
necessarily mean being safer.  For example, once a patient’s waiting time in the emergency 
department approaches the breach threshold, staff and managers might be tempted to revert 
to practices and shortcuts aimed at meeting the target (i.e. performing reliably), but which 
might pose additional risks to the patient’s safety.   
 
The reason why reliable performance does not by itself guarantee safe performance lies with 
the complexity of many modern systems, including healthcare [24].  Healthcare systems are 
characterised by changing demands and finite resources giving rise to competing 
organisational priorities, such as the management of patient flows and time-related 
performance targets [43].  Healthcare systems might be regarded more appropriately as 
Systems of Systems [44] or Complex Adaptive Systems [45].  For such systems, it is not 
possible to specify upfront every possible scenario and required form of response and 
behaviour.   
 
In order to succeed, such systems require a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability to 
deal with changes, surprises, and the unknown.  As a result, HROs need to do the opposite 
of the previous step – they need to be able to relinquish excessive managerial control and 
embrace performance variability.  Successful organisations operating in complex 
environments are those that are able to manage effectively this trade-off between 
managerial control through simplification, standardisation and anticipation of known risks on 
the one hand, and flexibility and adaptability through performance variability on the other 
hand [46].     
 
Resilience 
Recent literature in the area of Resilient Health Care provides many examples that the way 
everyday clinical work is unfolding – referred to as work-as-done (WAD) – is necessarily 
different from what those who design and manage health care systems assume – referred to 
as work-as-imagined (WAI) [47-49].  This is because healthcare professionals are able to 
make dynamic trade-offs and to adjust their performance in order to meet changing 
demands and deal with disturbances and surprises [18, 24, 43, 46, 50].  Empirical studies of 
everyday clinical work provide a diverse range of examples of such performance 
adjustments in practice [51-53]. 
 
One specific example comes from the study of handover in emergency care, where 
clinicians need to make many different trade-offs [39, 43].  For example, when ambulances 
are queuing at the emergency department, ambulance crews might hand over their patient to 
another crew waiting in line in order to save time.  The second crew will then be less familiar 
with the patient when they eventually hand over the patient to the emergency department 
staff.  Ambulance crews in this instance are trading the risk of not meeting clinical need in 
the community due to queuing with the risk of having a poor quality handover from a crew 
who are not familiar with the patient.  The empirical work demonstrated that clinicians 
resolve such tensions dynamically, and sometimes in violation of the formal time-related 
performance target, based on the specifics of the situation and on their sense of “being 
worried” about the patient in their care [46, 52]. 
 
Such necessary performance adjustments contribute to organisational resilience [50] by 
adding the adaptive capacity that is required to operate successfully in complex 
environments.  From a WAI perspective, on the other hand, performance variability is often 
regarded as detrimental deviations or violations [54].  The challenge for organisations is to 
manage this seeming contradiction mindfully.   
 
Organisational Learning – Sustaining Progress 
HROs are learning organisations 
The principles of mindful organising suggest that, first and foremost, HROs are learning 
organisations [25].  Encouraging active reporting by staff, demonstrating a commitment to 
listen, and providing the necessary resource and infrastructure for acting on concerns 
underpin mindful organising.  
 
Organisational learning can be characterised as a continuous cycle of action and reflection 
[55].  Organisations might be more successful at learning from past experience if they create 
and foster the capacity for deep reflection on whole system dynamics, which can lead to 
fundamental change [56].  On the other hand, insistence on past traditions, and quick fixes 
to existing strategies and procedures might inhibit more powerful forms of organisational 
learning.  Organisations have a range of learning processes at their disposal, which might be 
internal (for example audits and adverse event reviews) as well as external (for example 
feedback from the regulator) [57].   
 
Many organisations are relying on incident reporting systems as a key process for reporting 
and organisational learning [58-60].  Ideally, effective learning from incidents triggers 
improvements in practice that enhance safety and productivity [61].  The analysis of 
incidents seeks to reveal contributory factors and underlying causes [58], which can then be 
addressed in order to reduce the likelihood of incidents recurring.  Learning from past 
experiences does not have to be limited to the consideration of incidents, but can also 
include monitoring and analysis of leading indicators, or even weak signals [62].  However, 
there is increasing evidence in the literature that suggests that effective learning from past 
experiences in order to improve safety performance remains challenging even in traditional 
safety-critical industries [59, 61, 63].     
 
The challenges of organisational learning in healthcare 
Following the public inquiry into the failings at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, the 
subsequent Berwick report generated lessons and suggestions for change for the UK 
government and the National Health Service (NHS) in England [64].  The report 
recommends that the NHS should aim to become a system devoted to continuous learning 
and improvement of patient care.  This is clearly a fundamental requirement for any 
healthcare organisation aspiring to improve the safety of care to higher levels.   
 
Incident reporting as an instrument for organisational learning was introduced into the NHS 
about thirteen years ago, following a publication by the Department of Health [10].  This 
report recommended the development of a reporting system based on the model of incident 
reporting used in commercial aviation.  Incident reporting is well established in the NHS, and 
it is regarded as a key instrument for improving patient safety and the quality of services [12, 
65].    
 
In one respect, incident reporting in the NHS has been very successful.  There are a 
staggering number of incidents reported every year.  However, despite the large number of 
potential learning opportunities, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of 
incident reporting systems to contribute to improvements in patient safety [19, 66-69].  There 
are now many studies that document barriers to effective incident reporting in health care.  
Such barriers include, for example, fear of blame and repercussions, poor usability of 
incident reporting systems, perceptions among doctors that incident reporting is a nursing 
process, lack of feedback to staff who report incidents, and lack of visible improvements to 
the local work environment as a result of reported incidents [67, 68, 70-73].  Among 
management staff in particular, there continues to be widespread misperception that incident 
reporting systems might be useful for monitoring incident frequencies, despite evidence that 
suggests that incident reporting data are poor indicators of actual incident frequencies [74].  
It has been suggested that the focus of learning from incidents in health care has been too 
much on collecting and categorising data [68, 75], whereas successful learning from 
experience should inherently be a social and participative process [61, 68]. 
 
Learning from the ordinary 
How can health care organisations enhance their ability to learn from past experience in 
order to set them on the path towards becoming an HRO given the obstacles and practical 
difficulties with learning from incidents outlined above?  One way might be to shift the focus 
from formal learning about extraordinary failures and incidents towards more de-centralised, 
local forms of learning about everyday clinical work [76].   
 
An example of such a local form of learning is the Proactive Risk Monitoring in Healthcare 
(PRIMO) approach.  This approach to organisational learning was developed in order to elicit 
a rich contextual picture of the local work environment, to move away from negative and 
threatening notions of errors and mistakes, and to encourage active participation and 
ownership with clear feedback for local work practices [72, 73]. The distinguishing feature of 
the PRIMO approach is that it focuses on learning from the ordinary, in this case the various 
hassles that practitioners experience in their everyday clinical work.   
 
Hassle in this instance can be defined loosely as anything that causes people problems 
during their daily work. Examples of hassle include, for instance, unavailable equipment 
such as drip stands on a ward or supporting equipment for undertaking radiographic 
procedures. There are a number of important benefits of learning from everyday hassle. 
Among these the most important benefit is arguably that the focus on hassle supports 
building an understanding of the system dynamics, i.e., of the way performance adjustments 
are made, and the way work ordinarily unfolds. Reports of hassle typically contain not only 
descriptions of how the hassle manifested itself, but also how people coped – how they 
adapted their behaviour in order to continue to provide safe and good quality care [46]. 
Examples of typical adaptations made by health care professionals include the sharing of 
information and personal negotiation to create a shared awareness, prioritisation of goals 
and of activities, and offering and seeking help.  
 
Other local and informal processes that organisations might consider supporting include 
regular staff meetings aimed at identifying ways to improve the delivery of care, informal 
discussions between staff and their managers, and discussions among peers, and informal 
lunchtime improvement groups.  Such processes are perceived as locally owned, and they 
might be better suited to provide shared awareness, to make staff feel that they are being 
listened to and that they can make a contribution to improving patient safety, and for 
generating ownership for improvement interventions [76].   
 
Research suggests that where organisational effort is invested to support and include such 
processes, these can have a positive effect on staff engagement in reporting and learning 
activities [72] and on patient safety [77].  Utilising a range of processes that draw upon and 
strengthen different aspects of an organisation’s culture might enable healthcare 
organisations to deliver more sustainable improvements in patient safety [78]. 
 
Conclusion 
Some industries and organisations have a remarkable safety track record despite operating 
complex technology in hazardous environments.  The study of how such organisations 
manage safe operations over long periods of time has given rise to the theory of HROs and 
a corresponding model of mindful organising.  A mindful organisation is characterised by a 
strong commitment to reliability, resilience and organisational learning.   
 
The path towards becoming an HRO is challenging, and the journey requires vision, 
leadership, and an organisational culture of safety and improvement.  Experiences from 
industry suggest that even in ultra-safe organisations this remains a challenge and a daily 
struggle.     
 
Healthcare systems, such as the NHS in England, have made progress with patient safety, 
but much more needs to be done to reassure patients that the care they receive is safe.  The 
reliability of processes can be improved using a number of established process improvement 
and risk management tools.  The importance of resilience and the positive contribution of 
performance variability are only now starting to become recognised in healthcare.  This 
might lead to greater authority and responsibility being given to front line staff for improving 
services.  Similarly, organisational learning has been recognised as a priority, but it has been 
managed centrally through formal structures, such as incident reporting systems, and with 
limited success.  Healthcare organisations need to explore how they can provide support to 
less formal, locally owned mechanisms for organisational learning.   
 
Organisations do not become HROs overnight.  Improvement can start locally, in any area of 
an organisation.  Key to this are always individuals, local champions, with a strong desire to 
improve the safety and quality of care delivered to patients.   
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